Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids

International Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 70-91

  Gautam, Raghav Kumar ^a   Hemachandra, N ^b   Narahari, Y ^a   Prakash, Hastagiri ^a   Kulkarni, Devadatta ^c   Tew, Jeffrey D ^c  

^a INDIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (India)

^b INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY BOMBAY   (India)

^c GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION   (United States)

Author keywords

IC; Incentive compatibility; Individual rationality; IR; Multi unit procurement; Optimal mechanism; Volume discounts

Indexed keywords

EID: 66949116383     PISSN: 17457645     EISSN: 17457653     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1504/IJOR.2009.026244     Document Type: Article

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