Auction-based mechanisms for electronic procurement

IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 297-321

  Chandrashekar, T S ^a   Narahari, Y ^a   Rosa, Charles H ^b   Kulkarni, Devadatta M ^b   Tew, Jeffrey D ^b   Dayama, Pankaj ^c  

^a INDIAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE   (India)

^b GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION   (United States)

^c India Science Lab   (India)

Author keywords

Auctions; Combinatorial auctions; E Procurement; Game theory; Mechanism design; Multi item auctions; Multiattribute auctions; Negotiations; NP hard problems; Single item auctions; Volume discount auctions

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; E-PROCUREMENT; MECHANISM DESIGN; VOLUME DISCOUNT AUCTIONS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 34547420820     PISSN: 15455955     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TASE.2006.885126     Document Type: Article

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