A strategy with novel evolutionary features for the iterated prisoner's dilemma

Evolutionary Computation

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 257-274

  Li, Jiawei ^a   Kendall, Graham ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Evolutionarily stable; Identification mechanism; Invasion barrier; Iterated prisoner's dilemma

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BIOLOGICAL MODEL; COMPARATIVE STUDY; COMPUTER SIMULATION; EVALUATION; EVOLUTION; GAME; STATISTICAL MODEL;

COMPUTER SIMULATION; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; MODELS, GENETIC; MODELS, STATISTICAL;

EID: 66549118726     PISSN: 10636560     EISSN: 15309304     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/evco.2009.17.2.257     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Ashlock, W., and Ashlock, D. (2006). Changes in prisoner's dilemma strategies over evolutionary time with different population sizes. Proceedings of the 2006 Congress on Evolutionary Computation, pp. 297-304.
2. Ashlock, D., Smucker, M., Stanley, E., and Tesfatsion, L. (1996). Preferential partner selection in an evolutionary study of prisoner's dilemma. BioSystems, 37:99-125.
3. Axelrod, R. (1980a). Effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24:3-25
4. Axelrod, R. (1980b). More effective choice in the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24:379-403.
5. Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
6. Boyd, R., and Lorberbaum, J. (1987). No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game. Nature, 327:58-59.
7. Carmel, D., and Markovitch, S. (1998). How to explore your opponent's strategy (almost) optimally. Proceedings of the International Conference on Multi Agent Systems, pp. 64-71.
8. Chong, S., Humble, J., Kendall, G., Li, J., and Yao, X. (2007). Iterated prisoner's dilemma and evolutionary game theory. In G. Kendall, X. Yao, and S. Y. Chong, (Eds.), The Iterated Prisoners Dilemma: 20 Years On, chapter 2. Singapore: World Scientific.
9. Cooper, R., Jong, D., Forsythe, R., andRoss, T. (1996). Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games. Games and Economic Behavior, 12(2):187-218.
10. Darwen, P., and Yao, X. (2002). Coevolution in iterated prisoner's dilemma with intermediate levels of cooperation: Application to missile defence. International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Applications, 2(1):83-107.
11. Farrell, J. (1995). Talk is cheap. The American Economic Review, 85(2):186-190.
12. Fogel, D. (1993). Evolving behaviors in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Evolutionary Computation, 1(1):77-97.
13. Fogel, D. (1995). On the relationship between the duration of an encounter and the evolution of cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Evolutionary Computation, 3(3):349-363.
14. Harsanyi, J. (1967). Games with incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players. Management Science, 14(3):159-182.
15. Hoffmann, R. (2000). Twenty years on: The evolution of cooperation revisited. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 3(2). Accessed 4/08/09 at.
16. Ishibuchi, H., and Namikawa, N. (2005). Evolution of iterated prisoner's dilemma game strategies in structured demes under random pairing in game playing. IEEE Transaction on Evolutionary Computation, 9(6):552-561.
17. Kahn, L., and Murnighan, J. (1993). Conjecture, uncertainty, and cooperation in prisoners' dilemma games: Some experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisms, 22:91-117.
18. Kendall, G., Yao, X., and Chong, S.Y. (Eds.). (2007). The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: 20 Years On. Singapore: World Scientific.
19. Kraines, D., and Kraines, V. (2000). Natural selection of memory-One strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 203:335-355.
20. Kreps, D., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., and Wilson, R. (1982). Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27:245-252.
21. Li, J. (2007). How to design a strategy to win an IPD tournament. In G. Kendall, X. Yao, and S.Y. Chong, (Eds.), The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: 20 Years On, chapter 4. Singapore: World Scientific.
22. Lindgren, K., and Nordhal, M. (1995). Cooperation and community structure in artificial ecosystems. In C. G. Langton, (Ed.), Artificial Life, An Overview (pp. 15-37). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
23. Lorberbaum, J. (1994). No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 168:117-130.
24. Lorberbaum, J., Bohning, D., Shastri, A., and Sine, L. (2002). Are there really no evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma? Journal of Theoretical Biology, 214:155-169.
25. Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
26. Nachbar, J., and Zame, W. (1996). Non-computable strategies and discounted repeated games. Economic Theory, 8:103-122.
27. Nowak, M., and May, R. (1993). The spatial dilemmas of evolution. International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, 3:35-78.
28. Nowak, M., and Sigmund, K. (1992). Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations. Nature, 355:250-252.
29. Robson, A. (1990). Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, Nash, and the secret handshake. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 144:379-396.
30. Rogers, A., Dash, R. K., Ramchurn, S. D., Vytelingum, P., and Jennings, N. R. (2007). Errorcorrecting codes for team coordination within a noisy iterated prisoner's dilemma tournament. In G. Kendall, X. Yao, and S. Y. Chong, (Eds.), The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: 20 Years On, chapter 9. Singapore:World Scientific.
31. Simon, H. (1990). A mechanism for social selection and successful altruism. Science, 250(4988):1665-1668.
32. Stanley, E., Ashlock, D., and Tesfatsion, L. (1994). Iterated prisoner's dilemma with choice and refusal of partners. In C. Langton, (Ed.), Artificial Life III, pp. 131-175. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
33. Thibert-Plante, X., and Charbonneau, P. (2007). Crossover and evolutionary stability in the prisoner's dilemma. Evolutionary Computation, 15(3):321-344.
34. Thomas, B. (1985). On evolutionarily stable sets. Journal of Mathematical Biology, 22:105-115.
35. Wiseman, T., and Yilankaya, O. (2001). Cooperation, secret handshakes, and imitation in the prisoner's dilemma. Games and Economic Behavior, 37:216-242.