Twenty years on: The evolution of cooperation revisited

JASSS

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2000, Pages

  Hoffmann, Robert ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Axelrod; Bounded rationality; Computer simulations; Evolution; Prisoner's dilemma

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009348477     PISSN: 14607425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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