Designing the public domain

Harvard Law Review

Volumn 122, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 1489-1510

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EID: 65349184423     PISSN: 0017811X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (134)

1. See generally Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2004) (describing and criticizing the "romance" of the public domain in intellectual property scholarship).
2. William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 172 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (advocating a "social-planning" theory of copyright, with obvious implications for a republican public domain);
3. see also Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004).
4. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999).
5. Economic defenses of the public domain as such are relatively uncommon. Instead, economic theories of intellectual property recommend a certain level of exclusive rights protection and a corresponding public domain, beyond which further enclosure would be inefficient. For important contributions to the economic analysis of intellectual property, see WILLIAM M. LAN- DES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003);
6. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (1962);
7. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969).
8. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 1, at 1337-38 (surveying various definitions and providing one of their own);
9. Christine D. Galbraith, Remembering the Public Domain, 84 DENY U. L. REV. 135, 135 n.s (2006). For a historical overview of the public domain, see Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215 (2003).
10. Some definitions are more obviously normative than others. See, e.g., David Lange, Re- imagining the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 463, 470 (describing the public domain as "a place like home, where, when you go there, they have to take you in and let you dance");
11. cf. ROBERT FROST, The Death of the Hired Man, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 34, 38 (Edward Conneruy Latham ed., 1969) ("Home is the place where, when you have to go there, / They have to take you in.").
12. See Benkler, supra note 3, at 362; James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33, 61- 68; Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 976 (1990) (including "works not subject to copyright" and the "aspects of copyrighted works that copyright does not protect" in definition of the public domain). Some believe that there are multiple "public domains," which complicates matters. See, e.g., Boyle, supra, at 58-62;
13. Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783 (2006). This Note addresses such a possibility infra p. 1510.
14. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 1.
15. Benkler, supra note 3, at 362. This definition is not universally accepted in its particulars, but it is standard in its inclusion of both uncopyrighted works and privileged uses of copyrighted works. Part of the appeal of the definition is that both those who vigorously support the public domain, such as Boyle and Benkler, and those who question it, such as Chander and Sunder, seem to endorse the definition. See id.;
16. see alsosources cited supra notes 7-8.
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
18. One question left open by this definition is whether uses that are permitted to anyone for a fee ought to be considered part of the public domain. Compare Chander & Sunder, supra note 1, at 1338 (including use "for nominal sums" in definition of the public domain), with Lawrence Les- sig, Re-crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 56, 57 (2006) (explaining that the public domain is "free" in that "[n]o one is paid for its use"). This Note takes no position on this debate.
19. The "crumbs theory" description refers to the crumbs left over after the intellectual property system has claimed all of the proprietary uses of information goods. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 1, at 1337.
20. The metaphor helps signal to the moral apparatus that there is a moral "situation." See LAWRENCE A. BLUM, MORAL PERCEPTION AND PARTICULARITY 42 (1994).
21. See generally Benkler, supra note 3; Boyle, supra note 7.
22. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004).
23. Cf. Roger j.H. King, Narrative, Imagination, and the Search for Intelligibility in Environmental Ethics, 4 ETHICS & ENV'T 23 (1999) (arguing that environmental ethical theories, to be cognizable, must be contextualized with narrative and metaphor).
24. See Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 137, 150(1993).
25. Boyle, supra note 7, at 70 (emphasis omitted). " Id. at 71.
26. Id. at 72.
27. Regarding core stories, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1166-67 (1995)- For a more general discussion of narrative in law, see ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 11o-42 (2000).
28. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 144 (2006). Professor Niva Elkin- Koren adds a helpful discursive element to this account, arguing that "social dialogue" in the public domain is a "meaning-making process[]" in which "[v]arious social agents are engaged in an on-going process of constructing the meaning of symbols." Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 232 (1996) [hereinafter Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change]; see alsoNiva Elkin- Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 34s (1995) [hereinafter Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue].
29. The simple conceptual geography here belies some complexity, since the conversation about the public domain is fractured, and much of the important work in support of the public domain comes in the form of arguments against the broadening of exclusive rights in information. The first major contributions to the public domain discussion were David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1981, at 147, and Litman, supra note 7, with a proliferation since the 1990s in works such as those cited supra notes 1-7. Emblematic of the recent focus on the public domain is the "free culture" movement. See LESSIG, supra note 15; see alsoFreeculture.org-Students for Free Culture, http://freeculture.org/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
30. There is some support for the public domain as such at the fringes of the economic discussion. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 306 (describing the social costs of patenting basic research);
31. id. at 93 (explaining why copyrighting ideas increases the cost of producing expression and thus decreases the amount and diversity of outputs). Professor Mark Lemley has offered an interesting proposal to allow more efficient use of copyrighted expression by giving public domain-like access to expression where users produce radical improvements, by analogy to "blocking patents." See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997).
32. See BENKLER, supra note 22, at 35-37.
33. Nonexcludability makes a market in information impossible without legal intervention, insofar as a market depends on excludability: A will not pay B for access to information unless B can exclude A barring such payment. Secrecy is one solution - reminiscent in some ways of the stationer's monopoly that preceded modern exclusive rights regimes, see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 33 (2003) - but A is unlikely to pay B for information without knowing what A is paying for, by which time A already has the information. In practice, of course, excludability can be achieved in certain circumstances through the operation of ordinary property law - by restricting licenses to access performance venues, for example - or through technology. See, e.g., Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.l. & TECH. 49, 59-65 (2006) (describing how digital rights management can limit access to information). To supplement intellectual property protections, some industries rely on nondisclosure and noncompete agreements. See generally RONALD J. GILSON, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
34. See Arrow, supra note 4, at 615-17.
35. See BENKLER, supra note 22, at 36-37.
36. See Arrow, supra note 4, at 618 ("Information is not only the product of inventive activity, it is also an input.⋯").
37. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
38. U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). This clause goes by many names.
39. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214 n.20 (2003) ("Patent and Copyright Clause");
40. Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, LAW & CON- TEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 173, 175 & n.io ("Exclusive Rights Clause");
41. Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783, 1793 (2002) ("Promote Progress Clause"). For a recent attempt to outline the scope of Congress's power under the Exclusive Rights Clause, see Recent Case, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1455 (2008).
42. See Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner; Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2375 (2003).
43. The discussion of Framing-era support here is meant to help outline the liberal position, not to argue either that this is a full description of the Framers' views, or even that the Framers' views are necessarily relevant to an analysis of the public domain. Some scholars have recently criticized the kind of historical account provided here. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 998-1046 (2006). But Professor Hughes's argument, while important, is largely inapt here, since unlike the scholars he criticizes, this Note does not intend to take this historical account to be of normative significance.
44. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 418, 423 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
45. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326,334 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905).
46. Id.
47. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). This passage frames Professor Benkler's analysis of the public domain in Benkler, supra note 3.489 U.S. 141 (1989).
48. Id. at 151. Justice O'Connor, the author of Bonito Boats, had similar things to say about copyrights and the importance of the public domain in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
49. On free speech and copyright injunctions, see Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998).
50. U.S. CONST, amend. I.
51. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
52. The literature on copyright and free speech is enormous, with important early contributions from Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970), and Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970).
53. More recent contributions include Benkler, supra note 3; Steven J. Horowitz, A Free Speech Theory of Copyright, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/horowitz-free- speech-theory.pdf; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001);
54. and Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002).
55. Fisher, supra note 2, at 172.
56. See Balkin, supra note 2.
57. For arguments of this kind, which have been primarily deployed in the copyright as opposed to the patent literature, see id.; Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991);
58. El- kin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue, supra note 22; Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change, supra note 22; Fisher, supra note 2; Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993).
59. Fisher, supra note 2, at 193; see alsoWILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 30-31 (2004).
60. See the economic argument, supra section I.B.1.
61. See Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue, supra note 22.
62. See generally Yochai Benkler, After Selfishness (Oct. 18, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
63. See Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head, 438 NATURE goo (2005).
64. See generally Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 589 (2001).
65. For a recent account of the complex relationship among the behavioral sciences, see Herbert Gintis, A Framework for the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences, 30 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (2007).
66. See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
67. See id. This important contribution is analogous to Professor Ronald Coase's observation that firms can often produce goods more efficiently than the market, and this analogy is reflected in the title of Benkler's seminal paper. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
68. Linux and Wikipedia are familiar enough. SETI@home is a distributed computing system that uses leftover computing cycles from internet-connected computers to run computations relevant to the search for extraterrestrial life. See SETI@home, http://setiathome.berkeley.edu/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2009);
69. see also BENKLER, supra note 22, at 81-82.
70. After recognizing the diversity of motivations, Benkler moves on, since an analysis of human motivation is beyond the scope of his project and, so long as people are diversely motivated, his model is an accurate one. See Benkler, supra note 54, at 423-36; see alsoBoyle, supra note 7, at 45-46.
71. See Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 105,105 (1971).
72. For reasons to resist a sharp dichotomy, see, for example, Mia Reinholdt, No More Polarization, Please! Towards a More Nuanced Perspective on Motivation in Organizations (May 2006) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-982108 (arguing for consideration of some motivations as between the poles of intrinsic and extrinsic).
73. Frey & Jegen, supra note 52, at 591.
74. Margit Osterloh & Bruno Frey, Motivation, Knowledge Transfer and Organizational Forms, 11 ORG. SCI. 538, 544 (2000).
75. Whether, as an empirical matter, this is the case has been the subject of debate, most notably between Professor Richard Titmuss, see RICHARD TLTMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (197 i), and Professor Kenneth Arrow, see Kenneth Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343 (1972). For a helpful description of this debate, see Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 321-24 (2004).
76. For a description of various design levers, see Yochai Benkler, Law, Policy, and Cooperation, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., forthcoming 2009).
77. See Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The "What" and "Why" of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior, 11 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 227 (2000).
78. See id. at 228.
79. See Osterloh & Frey, supra note 61, at 543.
80. Frey & Jegen, supra note 52, at 594-95.
81. For support of the claim that empowerment increases production, see, for example, Erika A. Patall, Harris Cooper & Jorgianne Civey Robinson, The Effects of Choice on Intrinsic Motivation and Related Outcomes: A M eta-Analysis of Research Findings, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 270 (2008) (analyzing forty-one studies and finding that providing choice enhances intrinsic motivation);
82. Sally Thomas & Penny Oldfather, Intrinsic Motivations, Literacy, and Assessment Practices: "That's My Grade. That's Me.", 32 EDUC PSYCHOL. 107 (1997) (applying Deci and Ryan's theory to the design of educational and grading systems).
83. Deci & Ryan, supra note 64, at 235.
84. Osterloh & Frey, supra note 61, at 545.
85. See Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey, The Sound of Silence in Prisoner's Dilemma and Dictator Games, 38 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 43, 53 (1999) (arguing that increasing solidarity and decreasing social distance are important in increasing intrinsic motivation).
86. See Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1998).
87. See eBay, Feedback Forum, http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/ feedback.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (describing the "Feedback Forum," eBay's reputation system).
88. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865 (2007).
89. Peter Schmuck, Tim Kasser & Richard M. Ryan, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals: Their Structure and Relationship to Well-Being in German and U.S. College Students, 50 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 225, 226 (2000). One way to draw this distinction is to say that the intrinsic motivation account recommends reputation systems as a means to foster an individual's sense of belonging within a community, whereas an extrinsic account sees the value of reputation in producing "popularity" or instrumental power. See, e.g., Kennon M. Sheldon & Tim Kasser, Psychological Threat and Extrinsic Goal Striving, 32 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 37 (2008) (distinguishing between the intrinsic goal of community and the extrinsic goal of popularity).
90. See Alexander Ardichvili, Vaughn Page & Tim Wentling, Motivation and Barriers to Participation in Virtual Knowledge-Sharing Communities of Practice, 7 J. KNOWLEDGE MGMT. 64, 69 (2003) (including a finding that knowledge contributions increase when employees see knowledge as a public good for the organization as a whole);
91. Adam M. Grant, Does Intrinsic Motivation Fuel the Prosocial Fire? Motivational Synergy in Predicting Persistence, Performance, and Productivity, 93 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 48 (2008) (describing performance gains produced by intrinsic motivation);
92. Schmuck, Kasser & Ryan, supra note 75, at 226 (describing the improved well- being that results from the realization of intrinsic goods);
93. Kennon M. Sheldon & Holly A. McGregor, Extrinsic Value Orientation and "The Tragedy of the Commons", 68 J. PERSONALITY 383 (2000) (providing experimental evidence that groups of intrinsically-oriented persons outperform groups of extrinsically-oriented persons in commons dilemmas).
94. See Schmuck, Kasser & Ryan, supra note 75, at 226. Whether eBay's reputation system is purely instrumental or at least partly intrinsically valuable is an empirical question.
95. See Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human Altruism, 422 NATURE 137, 137 (2003).
96. See id. at 139-40.
97. See Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions, 73 ECONOMETRICA 2017, 2026-29 (2005).
98. See Deci & Ryan, supra note 64. For support of the claim that perceived fairness affects pro-social behavior, see, for example, Oded Nov & George Kuk, Open Source Content Contributors' Response to Free-Riding: The Effect of Personality and Context, 24 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 2848 (2008).
99. On reciprocity, see generally DAN M. KAHAN, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, in MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS 339 (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005). In public good games, communication tends to increase cooperation, a finding that Professors Colin Camerer and Ernst Fehr have interpreted to be evidence of anticipated reciprocation. Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr, Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists, in FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIALITY 55 Joseph Henrich et al. eds., 2004).
100. This is, of course, not the only possible explanation. A may also contribute because she can only expect B, C, and D to contribute in the future if A does so as well, and the benefits of B, C, and D's future contributions outweigh the costs to A of contributing. But since A cannot count on the future contributions of others, trust and reciprocity dynamics would seem to be in play even in this scenario.
101. Deci & Ryan, supra note 64, at 229 (emphasis omitted).
102. See id. at 235-37.
103. Id. at 236.
104. The Peer to Patent Project: Community Patent Review, http://dotank.nyls. edu/communitypatent/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2009).
105. ASS'N OF INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS' STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/backgrounddocs/ bestpractices.pdf [hereinafter statement].
106. See ROGER e. SCHECTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS § 13.1 (2003) (providing a brief overview of patent law).
107. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1066 & n.139 (2003).
108. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 61 (2005). Professor Lemley has argued that the "rational ignorance" built into the system is efficient and by design. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495-97 (2001).
109. See Beth Simone Noveck, "Peer to Patent": Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 124 (2006).
110. See generally Noveck, supra note 92.
111. See id. at 146.
112. See id. at 151-61 (describing the benefits of the Peer to Patent project).
113. See id. at 148-49.
114. See id. at 149-50.
115. See Extension and Expansion of Pilot Concerning Public Submission of Peer Reviewed Prior Art, 133 Off. Gaz. Pat. & Trademark Office 103 (Aug. 12, 2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/off1ces/pac/dapp/opla/ preognotice/peerreviewexpansiono71708.pdf; see alsoPress Release, The Peer to Patent Project: Community Peer Review of Patents, USPTO Extends and Expands Peer Review Pilot Quly 20, 2008), available at http://cairns.typepad.com/ peertopatent/2008/07/uspto-extends-a.html.
116. On internalization, see supra p. 1504.
117. See generally Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809 (2007).
118. Consider, for example, the relationship between fairness, reciprocity, and cooperation, discussed supra p. 1502.
119. 17 u.s.C. § 107 (2006).
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1990).
122. See 17 u.s.c. § 504(0)(2) (2006).
123. See generally Peter Jaszi, Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 715; Pat Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Fair Use and Best Practices: Surprising Success, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2007, available at http://www.iptoday.com/ articles/2007-10-aufderheide.asp.
124. See, e.g., STATEMENT, supra note 88, at 5.
125. See Aufderheide & Jaszi, supra note 106.
126. See STATEMENT, supra note 88, at 1.
127. Id. at 4-6.
128. Id. at 4.
129. Aufderheide & Jaszi, supra note 106. There are some who doubt whether customary practices like the Statement are a good idea. See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007). But see Michael J. Madison, A Pattern- Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004) (suggesting that fair use doctrine is best operationalized through patterns of acceptable uses in particular cultural contexts).
130. See Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions, h.r. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681-83.
131. See Samuelson, supra note 7 (arguing for many public domains).
132. On industry-specific innovation and patenting, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003).
133. See Ostrom, supra note 72, at 15.
134. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 115, at 1637.