Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 59, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 240-259

  Andreoni, James ^a   Che, Yeon Koo ^b   Kim, Jinwoo ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^c Yonsei University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248549851     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.003     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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