Multi-unit auctions: A comparison of static and dynamic mechanisms

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 304-323

  Manelli, Alejandro M ^a   Sefton, Martin ^b   Wilner, Benjamin S ^c  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^c Law and Economics Consulting Group   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Experiments; Multi unit auctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749127415     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.04.014     Document Type: Article

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