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Economic Theory

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 103-119

Survival auctions

(3) Kagel, John H a Pevnitskaya, Svetlana b Ye, Lixin a

a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY (United States)

b FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY (United States)

Author keywords

Ausubel auction; Multi unit demand auction; Survival auction; Vickrey auction

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547144291 PISSN: 09382259 EISSN: 14320479 Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0156-9 Document Type: Conference Paper

Times cited : (6)

References (13)

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2
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3
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- Kagel, J.H.¹ Harstad, R.M.² Levin, D.³

4
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- OSU Working Paper
- Kagel, J.H., Kinross, S., Levin, D.: Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: an experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents. OSU Working Paper (2003)
- (2003) Implementing Efficient Multi-object Auction Institutions: An Experimental Study of the Performance of Boundedly Rational Agents
- Kagel, J.H.¹ Kinross, S.² Levin, D.³

5
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- Independent-private values auctions: Bidder behavior in first-, second- and third-price auctions with varying numbers of bidders
- Kagel J.H., Levin D. (1993): Independent-private values auctions: bidder behavior in first-, second- and third-price auctions with varying numbers of bidders. Econ J 103, 868-879
- (1993) Econ J , vol.103 , pp. 868-879
- Kagel, J.H.¹ Levin, D.²

6
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- Behavior in multi-unit demand auctions: Experiments with uniform price and dynamic Vickrey auctions
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- Kagel, J.H.¹ Levin, D.²

7
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- Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: Some experimental results
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8
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- Revenue effects and information processing in English common value auctions
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9
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- Speeding up ascending-bid auctions
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10
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- Designing the PCS auction
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- Nalebuff, B.J.¹ Bulow, J.I.²

12
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- A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
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13
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.