What happens to CEO compensation following turnover and succession?

Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 424-447

  Elsaid, Eahab ^a   Davidson III, Wallace N ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR   (Canada)

^b SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO succession; CEO turnover; Compensation; Corporate governance

Indexed keywords

EID: 64649091446     PISSN: 10629769     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2008.04.001     Document Type: Article

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