On complexity of single-minded auction

Journal of Computer and System Sciences

Volumn 69, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 675-687

  Chen, Ning ^a   Deng, Xiaotie ^b   Sun, Xiaoming ^c  

^a FUDAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^c TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Communication complexity; Single minded auction; Time complexity

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; EQUIVALENCE CLASSES; PROBLEM SOLVING; THEOREM PROVING;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY; SINGLE MINDED AUCTIONS; TIME COMPLEXITY;

COMPUTER SCIENCE;

EID: 6344252885     PISSN: 00220000     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcss.2004.04.012     Document Type: Article

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