Effectuating public international law through market mechanisms?

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 165, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 33-57

  Van Aaken, Anne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 63049092394     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/093245609787369769     Document Type: Article

References (64)

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