The soft authoritarian tool kit: Agenda-setting power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

Comparative Politics

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 203-223

  Schatz, Edward ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 62749154949     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5129/001041509x12911362972034     Document Type: Review

References (114)

1. While it became normal to equate the Kyrgyzstani events with those in Ukraine and Georgia, this equation was a conceptual stretch. As Moldaliev puts it, "the opposition came to power not because it had become mighty, but because the political elite [vlast'] had turned out to be weak and unable to prevent. the destruction of the authoritarian system." See Orozbek A. Moldaliev, "Martovskaia revoliutsiia v Kyrgyzstane: Pervye uroki," in Orozbek A. Moldaliev, ed., Martovskaia revoliutsiia v Kyrgyzstane: Shag vpered Ui... (Bishkek: Biiiktik, 2005), p. 29. For his part, Moldaliev underestimates how durable authoritarian patterns would prove to be after Akaev's ouster.
2. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy, 13 (April 2002), 51-65
3. William F. Case, "Can the 'Halfway House' Stand? Semidemocracy and Elite Theory in Three Southeast Asian Countries," Comparative Politics, 28 (1996), 437-64
4. Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi- Authoritarianism (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
5. On the need to consider "democracy with adjectives," see David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research," World Politics, 49 (April 1997), 430-51.
6. Dissatisfaction with binary categories does not necessarily mean abandoning qualitative differences among types.
7. Francis Fukuyama, "Asia's Soft Authoritarian Alternative," New Perspectives Quarterly, 9 (Spring 1992), 60-61
8. The vast majority of authoritarian leaders have been men, so I use masculine personal pronouns.
9. John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002).
10. On the Almary violence in 1986, see S. Kasimov, "Politiko-pravovye uroki dekabr'skikh sobytii," in Nezavisimyi Kazakhstan: Dekabr' 1986 goda (Almaty: Institut Razvitiia Kazakhstana, 1996). On the Osh violence in 1990
11. see Valere;ry Tishkov, '"Don't Kill Me, I'm a Kyrgyz!': An Anthropological Analysis of Violence in the Osh Ethnic Conflict," Journal of Peace Research, 32 (1995), 133-49.
12. Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
13. Mark Beissinger, "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/ Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions," Perspectives on Politics, 5 (2007), 259-76.
14. Michael Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?," World Politics, 53 (2001), 325-61.
15. On Southeast Asia, see William F. Case, "When Do Voters Oust Authoritarian Rulers? Comparative Evidence from Southeast Asia," paper presented at the American Political Science Association conference, September 2-5,2004.
16. Edward Schatz, "Access by Accident: Legitimacy Claims and Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Central Asia," International Political Science Review (July 2006). Cédric Jourde suggests that the same is true for sub-Saharan African contexts. A history of Nigerian instability makes the case elegantly.
17. Sally N. Cummings, "Kazakhstan: An Uneasy Relationship-Power and Authority in the Nazarbaev Regime," in Sally N. Cummings, ed., Power and Change in Central Asia (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 5973.
18. On how western media downplay the tragedy suffered by ordinary Turkmen, see Eric Freedman, "Framing the Turkmenbashi: Western Press Portrayals of the President of Turkmenistan," paper presented at the Central Eurasian Studies Society conference, October 1, 2005.
19. In December 2006 Turkmenbashy died. His successor, Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov, offered initial policies which differed from those of his predecessor in minor ways.
20. By using the adjective "soft," I do not minimize the scope of the atrocities committed by these regimes. That atrocities are rarer than in "harder" authoritarian contexts is of no consolation to the regime's victims.
21. See Juan L. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 175-261.
22. Levitsky and Way.
23. Richard Snyder, "Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: The Spectrum of Non-Democratic Regimes," in Andreas Schedler, ed., Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006).
24. Jason Brownlee, "Ruling Parties and Regime Persistence: Explaining Durable Authoritarianism in the Third Wave Era," working paper, University of Texas at Austin, 2005.
25. One exception is Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities ofDomination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
26. Describing some persuasive techniques, Harley Balzer argues that Russia under Putin represented "managed pluralism," which was neither authoritarianism nor democracy. I would argue that by 2006 it had become a soft authoritarian regime, not unlike Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. See Harley Balzer, "Managed Pluralism: Vladimir Putin's Emerging Regime," Post-Soviet Affairs, 19(2003), 189-227.
27. On varieties of legitimacy, see Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1947).
28. 25.1 would like to thank Cédric Jourde for reminding me that the normative power of law is itself a variable.
29. Keith A. Darden, "Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma," East European Constitutional Review, 10 (Spring-Summer 2001).
30. The military leadership in Brazil in 1972-73, for example, successfully persuaded those "who [were] both heavily exposed to government-controlled communications and lack[ed] the education and other internal resources for resisting them." See Barbara Geddes and John Zaller, "Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes," American Journal of Political Science, 33 (May 1989), 341. Geddes and Zaller hold the persuasive policies of the (Brazilian) government constant, but persuasion varies across space and time.
31. See Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964)
32. Cédric Jourde, '"The President Is Coming to Visit! ' Dramas and the Hijack of Democratization in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania," Comparative Politics, 37 (July 2005)
33. Myron J. Aronoff, Power and Ritual in the Israel Labor Party: A Study in Political Anthropology (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1993).
34. See William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986)
35. William H. Riker, The Strategy of Rhetoric: Campaigning for the American Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).
36. Donald R. Kinder and Don Herzog, "Democratic Discussion," in George E. Marcus and Russell L. Hanson, eds., Reconsidering the Democratic Public (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993)
37. as quoted in Diana Richards, "The Strategic Manipulation of Mental Models" (unpublished manuscript, University of Minnesota, 2002), p. 3.
38. Jourde.
39. Orit Kedar and Kenneth Shepsle, "The Heresthetic of Big Choices" (unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, 2001).
40. Thanks to Lucan Way for pushing me to clarify this distinction.
41. Author's fieldnotes, December 2005.
42. Although it is beyond my scope to theorize the emergence of true believers, Nazxarbaev was skilled at using both material resources and the toolkit described below to persuade. Once persuaded, these true believers could be relied on for support.
43. On the use of such administrative resources in Ukraine, see Jessica Allina-Pisano, "Informal Politics and Challenges to Democracy: Administrative Resource in Kuchma's Ukraine" (unpublished manuscript, University of Ottawa).
44. See Olena Nikolayenko, "The Revolt of the Post-Soviet Generation: Youth Movements in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine," Comparative Politics, 39 (January 2007), 169-88.
45. Liudmila Kupopatkina, "Studenty v 'aktivnoi' pozitsii," Soz, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 4.
46. Cynthia Werner, "The Significance of Tribal Identities in the Daily Life of Rural Kazaks in South Kazakhstan," paper presented at the Association for the Study of Nationalities convention, April 24-26, 1997
47. Edward Schatz, Modern Clan Politics: The Power of "Blood" in Kazakhstan and Beyond (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004).
48. Allina-Pisano, p. 19.
49. Larisa Chen, "Kto ne s nami, tot idet von!," Soz, Nov. 30, 2005, p. 6.
50. Susan C. Stokes, "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," American Political Science Review, 99 (2005), 315-25.
51. 43.1 would like to thank Cédric Jourde for this insight.
52. Ermukhan Ertysbaev made this claim at the forum, "Výbory Prezidenta Kazakstana: Vybor lichnosti ili novogo puti razvitiia," December 8, 2005, Almaty, Kazakhstan. Author's fieldnotes. Pro-Nazarbaev billboards cost a fortune, but they probably did not by themselves exceed legal spending limits, as one ex-candidate for the presidency claimed. Interview, Almaty, December 8, 2005.
53. See Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), esp. ch. 5, "Economic Development or Stealing the State?," pp. 128-71.
54. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics.
55. Sally N. Cummings, Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite (London: I. B. Taurus, 2005).
56. The regime did little to prevent everyday human rights abuses, as watchdog groups continue to document.
57. Wilson's singular focus on virtuality makes him prone to exaggerate this feature. See Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
58. Freedom House. "Nations in Transit-Kazakhstan 2005," available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/inc/ content/pubs/nit/inc-country-detail.cfm? page=47&nit=372&year=2005&pf, accessed July 7,2006.
59. In May 2007 Duvanov initiated a public protest against antidemocratic amendments to the constitution. Attendance was anemic. Author's fieldnotes, Almaty, May 2007.
60. In late 2005 a state-sponsored Institute of Nomadism was created, with Masanov as director. Masanov, personal communication, Almaty, December 6, 2005.
61. Amre Tokmurzin, '"Lokhotron' poslednei nadezhdy: Tsennoe svidetel'svto nabliudatelia za nagloi fal'sifikatsiei na vyborakh," Epokha, Dec. 2,2005, p. 7.
62. Selections from Ertysbaev's commentary at the Polyton discussion group are offered in Galina Dyrdina, "Pusť budet ANOTHERbaev!," Pravo. Ekonomika. Politika. Kul'tura, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 4.
63. Author's fieldnotes, Almaty, December 2005.
64. Elections and Democracy, "Presidential Elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan-2005," press release, November 29, 2005.
65. This evaluation was often coupled with rhetorical questions about whether other OSCE countries' elections would themselves meet OSCE standards.
66. On this discourse, see Daniel Kimmage, "Kazakhstan: 'Sovereign Democracy' in Almaty and Moscow," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, electronic report, July 10, 2006.
67. Edward Schatz, "Transnational Image Making and Soft Authoritarian Kazakhstan," Slavic Review (forthcoming, Spring 2008).
68. Nurbulat Masanov, personal communication, Almaty, December 6, 2005.
69. Author's fieldnotes, Almaty, December 2005.
70. Aleksei Ikonnikov, "Vremia sobirať kamni?," Kontinent, Dec. 12-27, 2005, p. 17.
71. Ertysbaev, "Výbory Prezidenta Kazakhstana." Ertysbaev added that the television documentary resonated because people were already fearful, denying that the film itself had sown fear.
72. See Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, ch. 6.
73. Interview, Vremia, October 18, 2002
74. as reprinted in Azat Peruashev, Saiasi pikirtalastar: Politicheskie diskussii vpozitsionirovanii Grazhdanskoipartii Kazakhstana (Almaty: Zhasushy, 2005), p. 234.
75. John Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Island of Democracy! (London: Routledge, 1999).
76. Latvia joined the WTO later in the same year.
77. Eugene Huskey, "An Economy of Authoritarianism? Askar Akaev and Presidential Leadership in Kyrgyzstan," in Sally N. Cummings, ed., Power and Change in Central Asia (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 76-80.
78. In the same poll, 72.5 percent of Kazakhstani citizens expressed dissatisfaction with governance in their country. See Eric Max McGlinchey, "Paying for Patronage: Regime Change in Post-Soviet Central Asia" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2003), p. 213. This snapshot can not capture change. I expect that longitudinal data would show decreasing support for governance in Kyrgyzstan and increasing support for the same in Kazakhstan.
79. Leonid Levitin, "Liberalization in Kyrgyzstan: 'An Island of Democracy,'" in Yaacov Ro'i, ed., Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim Eurasia (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 187-213
80. International Crisis Group, Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the Island of Democracy, Report No. 22, August 28, 2001.
81. 71.1 would like to thank Bhavna Dave for this point.
82. International Crisis Group. Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State, Report No. 109, December 16, 2005, p. 1.
83. Ibid., p. 1.
84. Ibid., p. 4.
85. Moldaliev, p. 27.
86. On basing agreements, see Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Political Change and Security Contracts in the American Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).
87. See the letter to Akaev protesting residency requirements for candidates at http://hrw.org/english/ docs/2005/02/11/kyrgyz10167.htm, accessed July 10,2006.
88. On the constitutional court, see Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 15,2004. On the ombudsman, see Sultan Jamagulov, "Kyrgyzstan: Ex-Diplomats Contest 'Political' Election Ban," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, December 3, 2004, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o= 162137&apc-state=henirca2004, accessed July 10, 2006.
89. Akaev's judiciary was less politicized and less compliant than Kazakhstan's, but it qualified as "predatory." On the crucial role of the judicial branch, see McGlinchey.
90. International Crisis Group, Kyrgyzstan at Ten.
91. On repression of the media during the campaign season, see Moldaliev, pp. 35-36.
92. On Pyramida, see Abdan Shukenov, "V Kyrgyzstane poiavliaetsia novaia Sem'ia," Kapital.kz, December 15, 2005, p. A5.
93. Darden.
94. For an example of such depictions, see Nurlan Suleimenov, Daniiar Ashimbaev, and Viktor Andreev, Kazakhstan 90-x: Pravitel 'stvo Kazhegel 'dina-korruptsiia i bor 'ba za vlast ' (Almaty: Credo, 2003).
95. Nurbek Omuraliev, "Kyrgyzstan: Vremia peremen (sotsiologicheskii analiz)," in V. M. Ploskikh, ed., 24 marta 2005 g.: "Narodnaia revoliutsiia"?! (Bishkek: Ilim, 2005), p 83.
96. Kyrgyzstan retained its strongly presidential system, although Bakiev in 2005 promised a new constitution.
97. Scott Radnitz, "Networks, Localism and Mobilization in Aksy, Kyrgyzstan," Central Asian Survey, 24 (December 2005), 405-24.
98. If Kulov was inherently a stronger challenger to Akaev than Kazhegeldin had been to Nazarbaev, and if the parliament in Kyrgyzstan was inherently more independent than that in Kazakhstan, then Akaev needed a particularly well considered approach to be successful at discursive preemption.
99. Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, http://www.cjes.ru/lenta/ view-news.php7id=! 8880&year= 2002&lang=eng, accessed July 5, 2006. On the West's influence, see Nuriia A. Kutnaeva, "Vneshnie factory martovskoi revoliutsii-mif ili real'nost'?," in Moldaliev, ed., pp. 55-66.
100. On Azattyk's role, see Gulnoza Saidazimova, "Kyrgyzstan: Opposition Holds Protest ahead of First Election Results," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, available at http://www.registan.net/?p=4638, accessed September 18,2006.
101. In another bit of regime-sponsored "news reporting" in Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev's staged a preelection visit to Ukraine, discursively emphasizing that he did not fear Ukraine-like revolution in Kazakhstan. See Natal'ia Meleshchuk and Andrei Neezzhalyi, "Nursultan Nazarbaev: 'Ukraina dlia menia-kak pervaia liubov'!,'" Strana i mir, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 5.
102. Hamid Toursunof, "The Rumbles from Ukraine," Transitions Online, Dec. 13, 2004.
103. Anara Karagulova and Nick Megoran, "Gothic Kyrgyzstan and the 'War on Terror': Discourses of Danger and the Collapse of the Akaev Regime," paper presented at the Central Eurasian Studies Society conference, October 2006, p. 5.
104. Ibid., p. 2.
105. 95.1 would like to thank Fergus Eckersley, who was in Bishkek at the time, for this observation.
106. Schatz, "Access by Accident."
107. McGlinchey.
108. Vladimir Khanin, "Political Clans and Political Conflicts in Contemporary Kyrgyzstan," in Ro'i, ed., p. 225.
109. The two quoted phrases are from Huskey, pp. 88, 89, respectively. 100.1 would like to thank an anonymous reader for suggesting this point.
110. Interview with Bakhyt Beshimov, Bishkek, May 19,2006. See also Mirovoe razvitie v Ferganskoi Dolině, Kyrgyzstanskoe obschestvoposle směny vlasti: Ozhidaniia i reálii (Osh, Kyrgyzstan: unpublished report, 2006)
111. International Crisis Group, Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State.
112. Central among them were developing a new constitution and reining in organized crime figures who continued to influence the regime.
113. Interview with Emil Aliev, chair of the Ar-Namys Party, Bishkek, May 19, 2006.
114. On the changes under Akaev, see Anderson, esp. pp. 55-62; McGlinchey.aF