Optimal income taxation and public good provision with endogenous interest groups

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 311-342

  Bierbrauer, Felix ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 62449151236     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01412.x     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. AL-NAJJAR, N. (2004) Aggregation and the law of large numbers in large economies, Games and Economic Behavior 47, 1 35.
2. ARMSTRONG, A., and J. ROCHET (1999) Multi-dimensional screening: A user's guide, European Economic Review 43, 959 979.
3. ATKINSON, A., and N. STERN (1974) Pigou, taxation and public goods, Review of Economic Studies 41, 119 128.
4. BERGEMANN, D., and S. MORRIS (2005) Robust mechanism design, Econometrica 73, 1771 1813.
5. BERNHEIM, B., B. PELEG, and M. WHINSTON (1986) Coalition-proof Nash equilibria I. Concepts, Journal of Economic Theory 42, 1 12.
6. BESLEY, T., and S. COATE (2001) Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy, Review of Economic Studies 68, 67 82.
7. BIERBRAUER, F. (2008a) Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Robust Mechanism Design. Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Preprint 2008/31.
8. BIERBRAUER, F. (2008b) A Unified Approach to the Revelation of Public Goods Preferences and to Optimal Income Taxation. Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Preprint 2008/39.
9. BOADWAY, R., and M. KEEN (1993) Public goods, self-selection and optimal income taxation, International Economic Review 34, 463 478.
10. BOADWAY, R., K. CUFF, and M. MARCHAND (2000) Optimal income taxation with quasi-linear preferences revisited, Journal of Public Economic Theory 2, 435 460.
11. CLARKE, E. (1971) Multipart pricing of public goods, Public Choice 11, 17 33.
12. CREMER, H., P. PESTIEAU, and J. ROCHET (2001) Direct versus indirect taxation: The design of the tax structure revisited, International Economic Review 42, 781 799.
13. CREMER, H., P. PESTIEAU, and J. ROCHET (2003) Capital income taxation when inherited wealth is not observable, Journal of Public Economics 87, 2475 2490.
14. DEMANGE, G., and R. GUESNERIE (2001) On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms, Economic Theory 18, 367 389.
15. GAHVARI, F. (2006) On the marginal costs of public funds and the optimal provision of public goods, Journal of Public Economics 90, 1251 1262.
16. GAUBE, T. (2000) When do distortionary taxes reduce the optimal supply of public goods, Journal of Public Economics 76, 151 180.
17. GAUBE, T. (2005) Financing public goods with income taxation: Provision rules vs. provision levels, International Tax and Public Finance 12, 319 334.
18. GROSSMAN, G., and E. HELPMAN (2001) Special Interest Politics. Cambridge, MA : MIT Press.
19. GROVES, T. (1973) Incentives in teams, Econometrica 41, 617 663.
20. HELLWIG, M. (2004) Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Public-sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics. Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Preprint 2004/14.
21. JUDD, K. (1985) The law of large numbers with a continuum of iid random variables, Journal of Economic Theory 35, 19 25.
22. LAFFONT, J., and D. MARTIMORT (1997) Collusion under asymmetric information, Econometrica 65, 875 911.
23. LAFFONT, J., and D. MARTIMORT (1999) Collusion-proof Samuelson conditions for public goods, Journal of Public Economic Theory 1, 399 438.
24. LAFFONT, J., and D. MARTIMORT (2000) Mechanism design with collusion and correlation, Econometrica 68, 309 342.
25. MIRRLEES, J. (1971) An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation, Review of Economic Studies 38, 175 208.
26. NAVA, M., F. SCHROYEN, and M. MARCHAND (1996) Optimal fiscal and public expenditure policy in a two-class economy, Journal of Public Economics 61, 119 137.
27. SANDMO, A. (1998) Redistribution and the marginal cost of public funds, Journal of Public Economics 70, 365 382.
28. STIGLITZ, J. (1982) Self-selection and Pareto-efficient taxation, Journal of Public Economics 17, 213 240.
29. WEYMARK, J. (1986) A reduced-form optimal nonlinear income tax problem, Journal of Public Economics 30, 199 217.
30. WILSON, J. (1991) Optimal public good provision with limited lump sum taxation, American Economic Review 81, 153 166.