Queuing for expert services

Management Science

Volumn 54, Issue 8, 2008, Pages 1497-1512

  Debo, Laurens G ^a   Toktay, L Beril ^b   Wassenhove, Luk N Van ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c INSEAD   (France)

Author keywords

Operations economics interface; Queuing; Services

Indexed keywords

CAR REPAIRS; CONSULTANCY SERVICES; DESIGN IMPLICATIONS; FEE STRUCTURES; MARKET POTENTIALS; OPERATIONS-ECONOMICS INTERFACE; PRICE STRUCTURES; QUEUING; SERVICE CAPACITIES; SERVICE OPERATIONS; SERVICE PRICES; SERVICE TIME; SERVICES; SINGLE-SERVER QUEUES; STOCHASTICITY; VALUE OF SERVICES;

COSTS; CUSTOMER SATISFACTION; ECONOMICS; QUEUEING THEORY;

SALES;

EID: 61849111812     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0867     Document Type: Article

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