Milestone payments or royalties? Contract design for R&D licensing

Operations Research

Volumn 56, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1539-1552

  Crama, Pascale ^a   De Reyck, Bert ^b   Degraeve, Zeger ^c  

^a SINGAPORE MANAGEMENT UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^c LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Contract design; Health care: pharmaceutical; Principal agent modeling: adverse selection, moral hazard; Research and development: innovation

Indexed keywords

DESIGN; HEALTH CARE; OPTIMIZATION; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT;

CONTRACT DESIGN; INCOMPLETE INFORMATIONS; MANAGERIAL PRACTICES; OPTIMAL COMPOSITIONS; OPTIMAL CONTRACTS; OPTIMAL LEVELS; PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELING: ADVERSE SELECTION, MORAL HAZARD; PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS; PROJECT PHASE; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: INNOVATION; STRUCTURE CHANGES;

RISK MANAGEMENT;

EID: 61449192397     PISSN: 0030364X     EISSN: 15265463     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1080.0589     Document Type: Article

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