The economics of multidimensional screening

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, Volume 1

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 150-197

  Rochet, Jean Charles ^a   Stole, Lars A ^b  

^a Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84927973024     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511610240.006     Document Type: Chapter

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