Signaling quality through specialization

Marketing Science

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 168-184

  Kalra, Ajay ^a   Li, Shibo ^b  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Signaling; Specialization

Indexed keywords

EID: 60849117224     PISSN: 07322399     EISSN: 1526548X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1070.0300     Document Type: Article

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