The ratchet effect and bargaining power in a two-stage model of competitive bidding

Economic Theory

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 171-181

  Waehrer, Keith ^a  

^a BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033248321     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050246     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. Admati, A. R., Perry, M.: Strategic delay in bargaining. Review of Economic Studies 54, 345-364 (1987)
2. Ausubel, L. M., Deneckere, R. J.: A Direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information. Journal of Economic Theory 48, 18-46 (1989)
3. Cramton, P. C.: Strategic delay in bargaining with two-sided uncertainty. Review of Economic Studies 59, 205-225 (1992)
4. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Kahn, C. M.: Protecting the winner: Second-Price versus oral auctions. Economics Letters 35, 243-248 (1991)
5. Grossman, S. J., Perry, M.: Sequential bargaining with incomplete information. Journal of Economic Theory 39, 120-154 (1986)
6. Haile, P. A.: Auctions with resale. University of Wisconsin-Madison, mimeo (1996)
7. Kreps, D., Wilson, R.: Sequential equilibrium. Econometrica 50, 863-894 (1982)
8. Laffont, J-J., Tirole, J.: The dynamics of incentive contracts. Econometrica 56, 1153-1175 (1988)
9. McAfee, R. P., McMillan, J.: Bidding for contracts: A principal-agent analysis. Rand Journal of Economics 17, 326-338 (1986)
10. McAfee, R. P., McMillan, J.: Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic Literature 25, 699-738 (1987a)
11. McAfee, R. P., McMillan, J.: Competition for agency contracts. Rand Journal of Economics 18, 296-307 (1987b)
12. Milgrom, P. R.: Auction theory. In: T. F. Bewley (ed.) Advances in economic theory, Fifth World Congress, pp. 1-32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987
13. Riley, J. G.: Ex post information in auctions. Review of Economic Studies 55, 409-430 (1988)
14. Rothkopf, M. H., Teisberg, T. J., Kahn, E. P.: Why are vickrey auctions rare? Journal of Political Economy 98, 94-109 (1990)
15. Rubinstein, A.: Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50, 97-109 (1982)
16. Rubinstein, A.: Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information. In: A. Roth (ed.) Game theoretic models of bargaining, pp. 99-114. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985
17. Spulber, D. F.: Auctions and contract enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6, 325-344 (1990)
18. Waehrer, K.: A model of auction contracts with liquidated damages. Journal of Economic Theory 67, 531-555 (1995)
19. Wilson, R.: Strategic analysis of auctions. In: R. Aumann, O. Hart (eds.) The handbook of game theory, pp. 227-279. Amsterdam: North-Holland/Elsevier Science Publishers 1992