Approximate and online multi-issue negotiation

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 951-958

  Fatima, Shaheen S ^a   Wooldridge, Michael ^a   Jennings, Nicholas R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Approximation; Game theory; Negotiation; Online computation

Indexed keywords

A-PRIORI; APPROXIMATION; COMPLETE INFORMATIONS; COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT; DISCOUNT FACTORS; EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES; MULTI-ISSUE NEGOTIATIONS; NEGOTIATION; NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES; NP-HARD PROBLEMS; ONLINE COMPUTATION; POLYNOMIAL-TIME COMPLEXITY; RELATIVE ERRORS; TIME COMPLEXITY; TIME CONSTRAINTS; TIME POINTS;

AGENTS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; FUZZY CLUSTERING; GAME THEORY; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; STOCHASTIC CONTROL SYSTEMS;

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS;

EID: 60349115277     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1329125.1329315     Document Type: Conference Paper

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