Atomic congestion games among coalitions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4051 LNCS, Issue , 2006, Pages 572-583

  Fotakis, Dimitris ^a   Kontogiannis, Spyros ^b,c   Spirakis, Paul ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF THE AEGEAN   (Greece)

^b UNIVERSITY OF IOANNINA   (Greece)

^c Univ of Patras   (Greece)

Author keywords

Atomic Congestion Games; Coalitions; Convergence to Equilibria; Game Theory; Price of Anarchy

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; CONVERGENCE OF NUMERICAL METHODS; FINITE AUTOMATA; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PARALLEL ALGORITHMS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; ROBUSTNESS (CONTROL SYSTEMS);

ATOMIC CONGESTION GAMES; COALITIONS; CONVERGENCE TO EQUILIBRIA; PRICE OF ANARCHY; PURE NASH EQUILIBRIA (PNE);

GAME THEORY;

EID: 33746379903     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11786986_50     Document Type: Conference Paper

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