Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 851-868

  Cho, Seok ju ^a   Duggan, John ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Anti folk theorem; Bargaining; Median voter theorem

Indexed keywords

EID: 59749105119     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.011     Document Type: Article

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