Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 65, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 372-405

  Hernando Veciana, Ángel ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Auctions; Open information acquisition

Indexed keywords

EID: 59249091394     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.015     Document Type: Article

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