Participation costs and efficient auctions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 228-259

  Stegeman, Mark ^a  

^a VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030269025     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0116     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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