Successful uninformed bidding

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 29-53

  Hernando Veciana, Ángel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

Author keywords

Asymmetric bidders; Common value; Multi unit auctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142672766     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.002     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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11. Pesendorfer W. Swinkels J. The loser's curse and information aggregation in common value auctions Econometrica 65 6 1997 1247-1281