The effect of entry and information costs on oral versus sealed-bid auctions

Economics Letters

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 195-202

  Engelbrecht Wiggans, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

D44 (auctions)

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035584876     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00372-4     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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