Contracts with endogenous information

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 65, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 586-625

  Szalay, Dezsö ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Copula; Information acquisition; Mechanism design; Stochastic ordering; Value of information

Indexed keywords

EID: 59249086634     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.012     Document Type: Article

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