Labor market reforms, job instability, and the flexibility of the employment relationship

European Economic Review

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 19-36

  Matouschek, Niko ^a   Ramezzana, Paolo ^b   Robert Nicoud, Frédéric ^c  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Bates White LLC   (United States)

^c LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Bargaining; Labor market reform; Search

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; ECONOMIC INSTABILITY; EMPLOYMENT; LABOR MARKET; LABOR POLICY; LABOR PRODUCTIVITY; POLICY REFORM;

EID: 58849145220     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.03.002     Document Type: Article

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