The role of exclusive contracts in facilitating market transactions

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 347-371

  Matouschek, Niko ^a   Ramezzana, Paolo ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Frontier Economics y Barcelona School of Economics   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547395435     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: 14676451     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2007.00314.x     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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