The Significance of Board Interlocks for Corporate Governance

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 154-159

  Davis, Gerald F ^a  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Boards; Incentive structures; Interlocking directorships

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346028039     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.1996.tb00144.x     Document Type: Article

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