Communicating quality: A unified model of disclosure and signalling

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 973-989

  Daughety, Andrew F ^a   Reinganum, Jennifer F ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58149379617     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00046.x     Document Type: Article

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