Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 58, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 94-120

  Daughety, Andrew F ^a   Reinganum, Jennifer F ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33751092054     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.001     Document Type: Article

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