Products liability, signaling and disclosure

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 164, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 106-126

  Daughety, Andrew F ^a   Reinganum, Jennifer F ^a  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 41949102563     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/093245608783742174     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (34)

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