Costly information disclosure in oligopoly

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 121-132

  Cheong, Insuk ^a   Kim, Jeong Yoo ^b  

^a Hankuk University of Foreign Studies   (South Korea)

^b Kyung Hee University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1942442277     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00218.x     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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