Conditionality: Forms, function, and history

Annual Review of Law and Social Science

Volumn 4, Issue , 2008, Pages 13-29

  Babb, Sarah L ^a   Carruthers, Bruce G ^b  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

IMF; International financial institutions; World bank

Indexed keywords

EID: 57649221138     PISSN: 15503585     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.4.110707.172254     Document Type: Article

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