An analysis of IMF conditionality

Challenges to the World Bank and IMF: Developing Country Perspectives

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 55-90

  Buira, Ariel ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84940767864     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.7135/UPO9780857288202.005     Document Type: Chapter

References (29)

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