Upping the ante for political economy analysis of the International Financial Institutions

World Economy

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 317-332

  Willett, T D ^a  

^a CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

IMF; POLITICAL ECONOMY; WORLD BANK;

EID: 0035042960     PISSN: 03785920     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9701.00358     Document Type: Article

References (35)

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2. Subordinating the Fed to political authorities won't control inflationary tendencies
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4. The effectiveness of conditionality and the political economy of policy reform
5. The catalytic effect of lending by the international financial institutions
6. Future directions in the political economy of trade policy
7. The public choice of international organizations
8. The changing activities of international organization: The case of the international monetary fund
9. Political economy of the Bretton Woods institutions: Adapting to financial change
10. Principals, agents and the limitations of BWI conditionality
11. Whither the world bank and the IMF?
12. Towards a general theory of managerial discretion
13. Why the IMF needs reform
14. Lending credibility: The IMF and the post-communist transition
15. The high politics of IMF lending
16. Do IMF supported programs work?
17. A public choice view of international organization
18. Bureaucracy at the IMF and the world bank
19. The IMF: Lender of last resort or scapegoat?
20. Studying the fed: Towards a broader public choice perspective
21. Saving the IMF's seal of approval
22. The need for a political economic capability at the IMF