Cooperative behavior and institutions

Journal of Socio-Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 188-196

  Vatn, Arild ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF LIFE SCIENCES   (Norway)

Author keywords

Behavioral theory; Experimental economics; Institutions; Interdependence; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 57649185366     PISSN: 10535357     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2008.07.011     Document Type: Article

References (77)

1. Aldred J. Incommensurability and monetary valuation. Land Economics 82 2 (2006) 141-161
2. Álvarez-Farizo B., and Hanley N. Improving the process of valuing nonmarket benefits: combining citizens' juries with choice modelling. Land Economics 82 3 (2006) 465-478
3. Andreoni J. Impure altruism and the donations to public goods: a theory of warm glow giving. The Economic Journal 100 (1990) 467-477
4. Baron J., and Spranca M. Protected values. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 70 1 (1997) 1-16
5. Batson C.D., and Shaw L.L. Evidence for altruism: toward a pluralism of prosocial motives. Psychological Inquiry 2 2 (1991) 107-122
6. Biel A., and Thøgersen J. Activation of social norms in social dilemmas: a review of the evidence and reflections on the implications for environmental behavior. Journal of Economic Psychology 28 (2007) 93-112
7. Blount S. When social outcomes aren't fair: the effect of causal attributions on preferences. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process 63 2 (1995) 131-144
8. Bohnet I., Frey B., and Huck S. More order with less law: on contract enforcement, trust and crowding. American Political Science Review 95 1 (2001) 131-144
9. Bowles, S., 1998. Endogenous preferences: the cultural consequences of markets and other economic institutions. Journal of Economic Literature XXXVI (March), 75-111.
10. Bowles S. Microeconomics. Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution (2004), Princeton University Press, Princeton
11. Brekke K.A., Kverndokk S., and Nyborg K. An economic model of moral motivation. Journal of Public Economics 87 9-10 (2003) 1967-1983
12. Brock W., and Colander D. Complexity and policy. In: Colander D. (Ed). The Complexity Vision and the Teaching of Economics (2000), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, MA 73-96
13. Brouwer R., Powe N., Turner R.K., Bateman I.J., and Langford I.H. Public attitudes to contingent valuation and public consultation. Environmental Values 8 (1999) 325-347
14. Camerer C., and Thaler R.H. Anomalies. Ultimatums, dictators and manners. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 2 (1995) 209-219
15. Davis D.D., and Holt C.A. Experimental Economics (1993), Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
16. Deci E.L. Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 18 (1971) 105-115
17. Deci E.L., and Ryan R.M. Intrinsic Motivation and Self-determination in Human Behavior (1985), Plenum Press, New York
18. Eek D., Biel A., and Gärling T. Cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas when equality is perceived as unfair. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 31 (2001) 649-666
19. Elster J. Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science (1983), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
20. Etzioni A. The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics (1988), The Free Press, New York
21. Fehr E., Kirchsteiger G., and Riedl A. Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing?. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 2 (1993) 437-459
22. Fehr E., Gächter S., and Kirchsteiger G. Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: experimental evidence. Econometrica 65 4 (1997) 833-860
23. Fehr E., Kirchsteiger G., and Riedl A. Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets. European Economic Review 42 (1998) 1-34
24. Fehr E., and Falk A. Psychological foundations of incentives. Joseph Schumpeter Lecture. European Economic Review 46 (2002) 687-724
25. Fehr E., and Gächter S. Cooperation and punishment. American Economic Review 90 (2000) 980-994
26. Fehr E., and Gintis H. Human motivation and social cooperation: experimental and analytical foundations. Annual Review of Sociology 33 3 (2007) 1-22
27. Fiske P., and Tetlock P.E. Taboo trade-offs: reactions to transactions that transgress the spheres of justice. Political Psychology 18 2 (1997) 255-297
28. Forsythe R., Horowitz J.L., Savin N.E., and Sefton M. Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. Games and Economic Behavior 6 (1994) 347-369
29. Frey B.S. Not just for the money. An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation (1997), Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham
30. Frey B.S., and Oberholzer-Gee F. The cost of price incentives: an empirical analysis of motivation crowding-out. American Economic Review 87 4 (1997) 746-755
31. Frohlich N., Oppenheimer J.A., and Kurki A. Modeling other-regarding preferences and an empirical test. Public Choice 119 (2004) 91-117
32. Gintis H. Beyond homo economicus: evidence from experimental economics. Ecological Economics 35 (2000) 311-322
33. Gintis H., Bowles S., Boyd R., and Fehr E. Explaining altruistic behavior in humans. Evolution and Human Behavior 24 (2003) 153-172
34. Gintis H., Bowles S., Boyd R., and Fehr E. Moral sentiments and material interests. The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life (2005), The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts
35. Gneezy U., and Rustichini A. A fine is a price. The Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000) 1-17
36. Gneezy U., and Rustichini A. Pay enough or don't pay at all. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 3 (2000) 791-810
37. Gowdy J. The revolution in welfare conomics and its implications for environmental valuation and policy. Land Economics 80 2 (2004) 239-257
38. Güth W., Schmittberger R., and Schwarze B. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3 (1982) 367-388
39. Henrich J.R., Boyd R., Bowles B.S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H., and McElrath R. In Search of homo economicus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 91 2 (2001) 73-78
40. Hodgson G.M. Economics and Institutions A manifesto for a Modern Institutional Economics (1988), Cambridge Polity Press, Cambridge
41. Hoffman E., McCabe K., Shachat K., and Smith V. Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior 7 (1994) 346-380
42. Hoffman E., McCabe K., Shachat K., and Smith V. Social distance and other regarding behavior in dictator games. American Economic Review 86 (1996) 653-660
43. Holland A. Substitutability, or why strong sustainability is weak and absurdly strong sustainability is not absurd. In: Foster J. (Ed). Valuing Nature? Economics, Ethics and Environment (1997), Routledge, London 119-134
44. Holt C.A., Langan L., and Villamil A.P. Market power in oral double auctions. Economic Inquiry 24 (1986) 107-123
45. Lane R.E. The Market Experience (1991), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
46. Ledyard J.O. Public goods: a survey of experimental research. In: Kagel J.H., and Roth A.E. (Eds). The Handbook of Experimental Economics (1995), Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ 111-194
47. Mitchell R.C., and Carson R.T. Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The Contingent Valuation Method (1989), Resources for the Future, Washington DC
48. North D.C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
49. Ostrom E. A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action. Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997. American Political Science Review 92 1 (1998) 1-22
50. Ostrom E. Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 3 (2000) 137-158
51. Pillutla M.M., and Chen X.-P. Social norms and cooperation in social dilemmas: the effect of context and feedback. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 78 2 (1999) 81-103
52. Renn O., Webler T., and Wiedeman P. Fairness and competence in citizen participation. Evaluating Models for Environmental Discourse (1995), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands
53. Romp G. Game theory. Introduction and Application (1997), Oxford University Press, Oxford
54. Ross L., and Ward A. Naïve realism: implications for social conflict and misunderstanding. In: Reed E.S., Turiel E., and Brown T. (Eds). Values and Knowledge (1996), Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ 103-135
55. Roth A.E., Prasnikar V., Okuna-Fujiwara M., and Zamir S. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburg and Tokyo: an experimental study. American Economic Review 81 (1991) 1068-1095
56. Sagoff M. The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law and Environment (1988), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
57. Schulze G.G., and Frank B. Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility. Economics of Governance 4 2 (2003) 143-160
58. Screpanti E. Relative rationality, institutions and precautionary behaviour. In: Groenewegen J., Pitelis C., and Sjöstrand S.E. (Eds). On Economic Institutions-Theory and Applications (1995), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 63-84
59. Sen A. Rational fools: a critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 4 (1977) 317-344
60. Shogren J. A rule of one. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 88 4 (2006) 1147-1159
61. Slovic P., and Lichtenstein S. Preference reversals: a broader perspective. American Economic Review 73 (1983) 596-605
62. Smith A. In: Cannan E. (Ed). The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759(1976)), Methuen, London
63. Smith A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776(1976)), University of Chicago Press, Chicago
64. Sober E., and Wilson D.S. Onto others. The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (1998), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
65. Spash C.L. Multiple value expression in contingent valuation: economics and ethics. Environmental Science Technology 34 (2000) 1433-1438
66. Spash C.L. Non-economic motivation for contingent values: rights and attitudinal beliefs in the willingness to pay for environmental improvements. Land Economics 82 4 (2006) 602-622
67. Stagl S. Multicriteria evaluation and public participation: the case of UK energy policy. Land Use Policy 23 (2006) 53-62
68. Tancredi L.R. Hardwired behavior. What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality (2005), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
69. Tetlock P. Coping with trade-offs: psychological constraints and political implications. In: Lupia A., McCubbins M., and Popkin S. (Eds). Elements of Reason (2000), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 237-262
70. Thøgersen J. Monetary incentives and environmental concern: effects of a differentiated garbage fee. Journal of Consumer Policy 17 4 (1994) 407-442
71. Titmuss R.M. The Gift of Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (1970), Allen & Unwin, London
72. Tversky A., and Kahneman D. Rational choice and the framing of decisions. In: Hogarth R.M., and Reder M.W. (Eds). Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology (1986), University of Chicago Press, Chicago
73. Vatn A. Valuation and rationality. Land Economics 80 February (2004) 1-18
74. Vatn A. Institutions and the Environment (2005), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
75. Vatn A., and Bromley D. Choices without prices without apologies. Journal for Environmental Economics and Management 26 (1994) 129-148
76. Verplanken B. Habits and implementation intentions. In: Kerr J., Weitkunat R., and Moretti M. (Eds). The ABC of Behavioural Change (2005), Elsevier Science, Oxford 99-109
77. Walzer M. Spheres of justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (1983), Basic Books Inc. Publishers, New York