Regulating exclusion from financial markets

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 71, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 681-707

  Bond, Philip ^a   Krishnamurthy, Arvind ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CREDIT PROVISION; FINANCIAL MARKET; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; REGULATORY APPROACH;

EID: 3843051497     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2004.00300.x     Document Type: Article

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