The role of private benefits in information acquisition

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 68, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 626-631

  Hori, Kazumi ^a  

^a WASEDA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Agency cost; Asymmetric information; Information acquisition; Private benefits

Indexed keywords

EID: 56249118326     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.07.003     Document Type: Article

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