Reasoning about rationality and beliefs

Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004

Volumn 2, Issue , 2004, Pages 774-781

  Gal, Ya'akov ^a   Pfeffer, Avi ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Decision making under uncertainty; Game theory; Opponent modeling

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY; GAMES; OPPONENT MODELING; RATIONALITY;

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; DECISION MAKING; FORMAL LANGUAGES; GAME THEORY; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; STRATEGIC PLANNING; THEOREM PROVING;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 4544348834     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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