Fiscal policy and financial markets

Economic Journal

Volumn 118, Issue 533, 2008, Pages 1971-1985

  Akitoby, Bernardin ^a   Stratmann, Thomas ^b  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL FLOW; DEBT; FINANCIAL MARKET; FISCAL POLICY; INVESTMENT INCENTIVE; PANEL DATA; SOVEREIGNTY;

EID: 54049151619     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02198.x     Document Type: Article

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