Vickrey's model of traffic congestion discretized

Transportation Research Part B: Methodological

Volumn 42, Issue 10, 2008, Pages 873-889

  Otsubo, Hironori ^a   Rapoport, Amnon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Endogenous departure times; Symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium; Traffic congestion

Indexed keywords

ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; MOTOR TRANSPORTATION; TRANSPORTATION;

CONTINUOUS MODELING; DEPARTURE TIME; DISCRETE MODELING; EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTIONS; FINITE NUMBER; MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM; STRATEGY SPACE; URBAN TRAFFIC CONGESTION;

TRAFFIC CONGESTION;

COMMUTING; DISCRETE CHOICE ANALYSIS; NUMERICAL MODEL; TRAFFIC CONGESTION; TRANSPORTATION MODE; TRAVEL TIME; URBAN TRANSPORT;

EID: 52749096507     PISSN: 01912615     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2008.04.002     Document Type: Article

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