A multi-agent congestion and pricing model

Transportmetrica

Volumn 2, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 237-249

  Zou, Xi ^a   Levinson, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Agent based model; Congestion; Congestion pricing; Game theory; Queueing; Road pricing

Indexed keywords

EID: 85009629837     PISSN: 18128602     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/18128600608685663     Document Type: Article

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