Choice of routes in congested traffic networks: Experimental tests of the Braess Paradox

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 65, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 538-571

  Rapoport, Amnon ^a,b   Kugler, Tamar ^a   Dugar, Subhasish ^c   Gisches, Eyran J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Braess Paradox; Congested traffic networks; Experiments; Route choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 59249109335     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.007     Document Type: Article

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