Batch queues with choice of arrivals: Equilibrium analysis and experimental study

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 59, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 345-363

  Stein, William E ^a   Rapoport, Amnon ^b,c   Seale, Darryl A ^d   Zhang, Hongtao ^c   Zwick, Rami ^c  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^c HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

^d UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

Batch queueing; Equilibrium solution; Experimental economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248596929     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.008     Document Type: Article

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