Cryptographically-sound protocol-model abstractions

Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 115-129

  Sprenger, Christoph ^a   Basin, David ^a  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER NETWORKS; FOUNDATIONS; SECURITY SYSTEMS; STANDARDS; THEOREM PROVING;

COMPUTER SECURITY; REACTIVE SIMULATABILITY; SYMBOLIC MODELS;

ABSTRACTING;

EID: 51749114905     PISSN: 19401434     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2008.19     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (18)

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