Explicit Randomness is not Necessary when Modeling Probabilistic Encryption

Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science

Volumn 186, Issue SPEC. ISS., 2007, Pages 49-65

  Cortier, Véronique ^a   Hördegen, Heinrich ^a   Warinschi, Bogdan ^a  

^a LORIA   (France)

Author keywords

authentication; encryption; Probabilistic; protocol verification; secrecy; security models

Indexed keywords

ABSTRACTING; AUTHENTICATION; CODES (SYMBOLS); COMPUTER SCIENCE; DECISION THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

PROTOCOL VERIFICATION; SECRECY; SECURITY MODELS;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 34347206776     PISSN: 15710661     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.entcs.2006.11.044     Document Type: Article

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