The European Commission-Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations

Public Choice

Volumn 137, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 21-41

  Napel, Stefan ^a   Widgrén, Mika ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BAYREUTH   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TURKU   (Finland)

Author keywords

Council of Ministers; European Commission; European Parliament; Investiture procedure; Voting rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 50249120143     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9310-1     Document Type: Article

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