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Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 129-154

The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision

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EID: 33847359912     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0113-3     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (53)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.