Institutionalist Research on the European Union: A Critical Review

European Union Politics

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 125-144

  Dowding, Keith ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

European Union; institutionalism; rational choice theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84996156470     PISSN: 14651165     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1465116500001001006     Document Type: Article

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